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Abstract
Cities are recognised as key players in global adaptation and mitigation efforts because the
majority of people live in cities. However, in Europe, which is highly urbanized and one of
the most advanced regions in terms of environmental policies, there is considerable diver-
sity in the regional distribution, ambition and scope of climate change responses. This
paper explores potential factors contributing to such diversity in 200 large and medium-
sized cities across 11 European countries. We statistically investigate institutional, socio-
economic, environmental and vulnerability characteristics of cities as potential drivers of or
barriers to the development of urban climate change plans. Our results show that factors
such as membership of climate networks, population size, GDP per capita and adaptive
capacity act as drivers of mitigation and adaptation plans. By contrast, factors such as the
unemployment rate, warmer summers, proximity to the coast and projected exposure to
future climate impacts act as barriers. We see that, overall, it is predominantly large and
prosperous cities that engage in climate planning, while vulnerable cities and those at risk
of severe climate impacts in the future are less active. Our analysis suggests that climate
change planning in European cities is not proactive, i.e. not significantly influenced by antici-
pated future impacts. Instead, we found that the current adaptive capacity of a city signifi-
cantly relates to climate planning. Along with the need to further explore these relations, we
see a need for more economic and institutional support for smaller and less resourceful cit-
ies and those at high risk from climate change impacts in the future.
Introduction
Cities are seen as important agents for the implementation of climate change mitigation and
adaptation actions, as they have less complex governance structures than national and
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international bodies, while at the same time sufficient political power to implement actions
[1,2]. Moreover, in highly urbanized regions, adaptation and mitigation actions will have to
take place in or with cities. However, a recent analysis of urban climate change responses in
Europe—a highly urbanized region perceived as being a leader in terms of environmental poli-
cies [3]—showed that 35% of large and medium-sized cities have no dedicated mitigation plan,
72% have no adaptation plan, and only 25% have both an adaptation and a mitigation plan
with quantitative targets for greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions (see S1 Table). More-
over, there is considerable diversity within as well as across European countries, both in terms
of availability of climate change plans and the ambitions of GHG reduction targets [4]. How
can such diversity be explained and what drives cities to plan to mitigate and adapt to climate
change or prevents them from doing so? It is the aim of this paper to test the association
between urban characteristics and the development of urban climate change plans, and to iden-
tify common factors that influence urban responses to climate change.
Uncertainty about climate change impacts is often claimed to be an obstacle to the imple-
mentation of climate actions. However, our scientific understanding to date shows that
improved quantity and quality of climate information and greater certainty do not necessarily
lead to more and better (i.e., locally adapted and appropriate) climate change actions [5–7]. A
number of obstacles to the implementation of climate change actions are at play [8]. Both, the
fourth and fifth assessment reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC
AR4 and AR5) recognize the influence of drivers and barriers, or opportunities and constraints,
on adaptation and mitigation efforts in cities and human settlements [9–11].
Barriers are defined as “obstacles that can be overcome with concerted effort, creative man-
agement, change of thinking, prioritization, and related shifts in resources, land uses, [and]
institutions” ([8], p. 22027). Overcoming obstacles also requires sufficient political will, social
support, resources, and effort [12]. A barrier is therefore a hindrance that can be overcome,
and is therefore not insurmountable. Barriers are distinguished from limits, which are absolute
and unsurpassable [13]. Some authors regard biophysical and locational factors as limits (to
adaptation)[14]; we include environmental and locational factors as barriers in a wider sense,
as we assume that a certain degree of adaptation is possible to most of the locational factors
experienced in Europe. Nonetheless, barriers to adaptation are mostly, “social factors and con-
ditions (that) hamper our ability to adapt proactively to future environmental changes” ([15],
p.119), including cultural and cognitive barriers arising from different perceptions of vulnera-
bility, adaptive capacity and risk [16–19]. Drivers may be seen as the opposite of barriers and
as stimulators of political will, social support, resources and efforts. They can range from socio-
economic macro-variables, such as population and economic growth, to environmental pat-
terns and public opinion [20]. In the context of climate change policies, drivers are understood
as activities, processes or patterns that produce positive incentives for climate action (adapted
from OECD; see [21]).
However, there is danger that using the terms ‘barriers’ and ‘drivers’may suggest a clear-cut
causality between factors such as social conditions, natural processes and physical patterns,
and their impacts on adaptation and mitigation efforts. Such clear-cut causality may not always
exist, as drivers and barriers can be context specific. We acknowledge that barriers and drivers
do not imply mono-causality and that their degree of influence or explanatory power with
respect to climate change response may to some degree vary across contexts [22]. However, we
assume that a number of drivers and barriers are common across contexts and scales (see, e.g.
the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) [23], [24]).
Over the last decade, there has been a substantial increase in studies of the drivers and barri-
ers that influence mitigation and adaptation efforts. A recent literature review [15] found that
barriers differ across governance levels, i.e. cities versus nation states, and across domains, i.e.
Drivers and Barriers of Climate Change Plans across European Cities
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mitigation versus adaptation. It was also shown that the vast majority of scientific papers on
barriers to adaptation (N = 81) focus on the local or regional level and are based on a small
sample size or single case studies. There have been very few comparative studies of barriers and
drivers affecting climate change responses across countries, scales, and domains, and general-
ized knowledge about common influence factors is extremely limited [15]. This may be related
to the shortage of comparable data for large samples of urban areas and in turn to problems of
definition (for example of ‘urban’ or ‘resident population’), and measurement [22]. However,
to provide generalized knowledge beyond the level of individual case-studies, broad-scale stud-
ies are needed.
Studies have identified a range of factors that influence climate change mitigation and
adaptation efforts [25–29]. According to Bulkeley et al. ([22], p. 13), the factors most strongly
identified with mitigation planning are: leadership, competencies, resources, and political
economies. The IPCC highlighted institutional, legal, financial and cultural barriers, as well as
administrative and political ones as an obstacle to mitigation [24]. For adaptation, the IPCC
identified changes in population, age structure, income, technology, relative prices, lifestyle,
regulation, and governance as important [23]. However, these socio-economic drivers or barri-
ers to adaptation are not well understood [23,30]. Additional factors influencing climate
change adaptation include: scientific information and knowledge [18,31], local governance
capacity, multilevel governance, networks and partnerships, community engagement, and edu-
cation ([22], p.33). McEvoy et al. ([32], p.188) identified the main climate-related hazards of
concern (in the UK) as being increased temperature, changing precipitation patterns and an
increase in the frequency of extreme events, signifying that environmental factors can also be
important. Overall, the influence factors of adaptation seem less clear. The capacity to adapt is
believed to be more context and site specific [30,33].
Clearly, there are many factors that could be considered, though institutional, socio-eco-
nomic and environmental factors figure prominently in several lists. We therefore narrow
down our research question and review the institutional, socio-economic, and environmental
factors that potentially influence local climate change planning. We select a number of site-spe-
cific factors found in the literature and statistically test their relation to climate change
responses—urban mitigation and adaptation plans—across broader scales, i.e. in 200 large and
medium size cities that are regionally representative of 11 European countries investigated.
Review of Factors that Can Act as Climate Change Drivers and
Barriers
Institutional factors
Institutions are seen as crucial for urban climate change response. They provide support for
implementing both adaptation and mitigation efforts [34]. For mitigation, both the political will
and the institutional capacity to implement mitigation plans are seen as important [11], as are
financial and technical assistance, and know-how [11]. Successful adaptation seems to depend on
the establishment of a shared science-policy competence [26,35,36], that facilitates access to cli-
mate change information, impact analysis and interpretation [37]. Strong leadership is another
important factor [23,38]. If leadership is weak, identifying and agreeing goals and criteria can
become a barrier [8] and undermine the capacity and willingness to make decisions [5,18].
Climate networks foster knowledge and information exchange [39], establish norms and,
most importantly, give access to financial and political resources [25,40–42]. However, climate
networks are “not as open or inclusive as some of the more optimistic interpretations would
lead us to believe” ([43], p.537), as hierarchies of involvement can lead to the marginalization
of some actors. Relatively little is known about the participation of cities or city leaders in
Drivers and Barriers of Climate Change Plans across European Cities
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climate networks other than the big ones—i.e. C40 [44] and Cities for Climate Protection
(CCP)[40]. In particular there is little information about the influence of climate networks in
Europe, as most publications concentrate on the CCP in the US [40,41,45].
Higher-level, i.e. national, sub-national or regional government support, is also frequently
mentioned as a driver of climate action, both for mitigation (see [1] and [36] for the USA, and
[46] for UK cities), and adaptation (see [27] for Australia, [47] for Germany, [48] for Latin-
America, and [49] for Sweden). However, higher-level government support is not always suffi-
cient to drive urban climate plans. De Gregorio Hurtado et al. [50] show that Italian cities
develop more climate change plans than Spanish cities, although Spain has a national climate
strategy and Italy does not. To make a national strategy effective for translation onto the local
level, detailed and clear information on how to use the national strategy and its implications
for the regional and local level is needed. According to these authors, this is currently lacking
in Spain.
Socio-economic factors
Socio-economic factors have been identified as important drivers of local macro-trends [51],
such as CO2 emissions [28]. However, less is known about the influence of socio-economic fac-
tors on local climate change planning and policy.
For mitigation, higher personal incomes (affluence) are associated with increased household
GHG emissions [24], thereby potentially impeding mitigation [52], and high public costs and
the lack of public financial resources are often mentioned as barriers [18,24,49]. However,
incomes and public costs play an ambiguous role in adaptation, and the policy and planning
contexts are of extreme importance. For example, while high public costs are an impediment to
local adaptation in Norway [49] and Australia [27], the financial capacity of a city does not
seem to influence adaptation efforts in the US [53]. In the US, aggregated personal incomes
and poverty rates are more important influences on adaption than public budgets, possibly
reflecting the country’s distinctive planning systems and practices.
Poverty rates, together with factors such as age, gender, ethnic minority status, and educa-
tion, are also frequently mentioned in relation to social vulnerability to potential climate
change impacts [54,55]. Assuming that the experience of climate change impacts can shape
action [29,56,57], the presence of a large percentage of vulnerable groups in a city might be
linked to increased adaptation planning efforts [23]. Vulnerability is a strong determinant of
current and future climate change risk. Highly vulnerable cities (and populations) should
therefore particularly invest in adaptation.
Investments in urban performance and change increasingly involve modern Information and
Communication Technologies (ICT), as for example in the "smart city" concept [58]. Advocates
of smart cities maintain that the use of modern (information) technology will allow European cit-
ies to achieve sustainable urban development more easily [58]. If so, it seems reasonable to assume
that smart cities—and similar initiatives—are also forerunners in climate change planning.
There are potentially a multitude of socio-economic factors that drive climate change plan-
ning, including many that cannot be considered by this study. Though a larger set of factors may
potentially better explain differences and commonalities between mitigation and adaptation or
among regions (which Kriegler et al. [59] refer to as shared socio-economic pathways), there is
no commonly agreed set of socio-economic factors for mitigation and adaptation analysis.
Environmental factors
Studies that investigate the relation between mitigation planning and urban environmental fac-
tors are rare, although geographical and locational factors are noted to influence the belief in
Drivers and Barriers of Climate Change Plans across European Cities
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climate change and willingness to mitigate [60] and a number of locational factors are related
to GHG emissions. For example, lower temperatures in January entail higher emissions associ-
ated with home heating, while warmer summers result in higher electricity consumption asso-
ciated with space cooling [61]. However, urban environmental and locational factors have been
found to be associated with membership of climate change mitigation networks. In the US, for
example, cities in areas at high risk from climate change (e.g. measured as expected tempera-
ture change, casualties of extreme weather events, and coastal proximity) are more likely to be
members of the Cities for Climate Protection (CCP) program. Results also show that the odds
of a locality joining the CCP can be predicted from the surrounding landscape characteristics
[41].
Environmental factors acting as barriers or drivers of climate change adaptation are related
to climate change impact, risk and vulnerability. Vulnerability is conceptualized as a function
of weather and climate exposure, sensitivity to weather and climate (also referred to as climate
change impact) and adaptive capacity to react to the impact [62]. Vulnerability describes the
degree of past, current or future susceptibility of people or systems to climate change. Studies
show that the temporal dimension is very important for the perception of exposure to climate
change and thus for climate change planning. For example, a case study of Norwegian commu-
nities [29] found that adaptation efforts are mainly driven by past experiences of weather
extremes and not by anticipated future impacts of climate change. This finding is supported by
a study of the relationship between adaptation and flood risk versus flood damage in the US
[53]. It was found that flood risk and flood damage significantly drive adaptation, but that
experience of impacts and flood damage is a more powerful predictor of adaptation than antici-
pated impacts.
Composite vulnerability factors
We accept that determining and measuring factors that influence climate change vulnerability
and adaptive capacity is challenging, and the subject of debate among scholars [63]. Neverthe-
less, a city is potentially exposed to multiple climate risks as well as a multitude of other stress-
ors now and in the future [64], which in combination influence the severity of climate change
impacts as well as the capacity to respond to climate-related events [65]. This conceptualization
is at the heart of the vulnerability concept, as it includes institutional, socio-economic and envi-
ronmental factors [66]. Likewise, drivers of climate change planning potentially comprise a
range of factors from these three domains [30], which may be captured in aggregated vulnera-
bility indices that combine a number of factors from different domains into one measurement.
These are used when the multidimensional nature of the concept under investigation cannot
be captured using only one factor [67]. We test the influence on climate change planning of
aggregated future climate change impacts (from different climate change stressors), aggregated
current adaptive capacity, and aggregated future vulnerability [68].
Methods
We use a representative sample of 200 large and medium-sized cities from 11 European coun-
tries (S1 and S2 Tables). The cities are among those selected for the European Commission’s
Urban Audit (UA)[69]. The sample represents all UA cities from the 11 countries where
authors are familiar with the language and the country’s urban and climate policies [4]. The
sample of cities accounts for 16.8% of the EU-27 population (2008); the total population of the
11 countries represents 72.1% of the EU-27 population (2008).
For this sample of cities, we developed a database containing a number of city characteris-
tics, as well as information on the existence and content of urban adaptation and mitigation
Drivers and Barriers of Climate Change Plans across European Cities
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plans—which are the indicators used to assess climate change response [4]. We consider all
strategic policy and planning documents that contain the words ‘climate change’ in the title or
refer to climate change in the introduction, e.g. as a motivation for the plan's development (see
S1 Text for the selection process of planning/ policy documents). Thus climate change and sus-
tainable energy plans are included, but other sectoral plans, such as transport, waste manage-
ment or flood protection plans are excluded. Although the latter might be relevant for climate
change, their motivation and central aim are largely different. Adoption of the plan in question
is not a necessary condition for inclusion if a draft document or sufficient information about
the plan and its content is publicly available. A full list of the analysed climate change plans are
given in S2 Table.
The existence of a draft, approved and/or published climate change adaptation and mitiga-
tion plan, as defined using the criteria mentioned above, are the dependent variables. Based on
an inductive approach for indicator development as described by Hinkel [63], a number of
institutional, socio-economic, and environmental characteristics of cities are identified from
the literature as independent factors, forming potential barriers to, or drivers of climate plan
development (Table 1). We test the associations with 30 independent factors, some at multiple
points in time (S2 Text). The selection is to some extent contingent on the availability of data,
which is often limited for urban areas, compared for instance with national data. Moreover,
not all factors found in the literature are easily transferable, quantifiable or measurable, or
available in official statistics for all cities studied. We therefore also use appropriate proxy vari-
ables that are available for all cities, such as climate network membership for information
exchange. Data are obtained from Eurostat [70], which provides data relating to a number of
urban characteristics as part of the EU-wide Urban Audit; membership websites of climate net-
works; and the ESPON Climate project [68], which calculated aggregated indices of climate
change impacts, adaptive capacity and vulnerability for European regions (S2 Text provides
detailed information on factors, metrics, year, etc.).
Table 1. Potential drivers and barriers reported in the literature and factors tested in this study.
Institutional factors Socio-economic factors Environmental factors Composite
vulnerability factors
Factors
reported in
the
literature
Mitigation
factors
• Climate networks Access
to financial and technical
assistance
• • Winter and summer
temperatures
•
Adaptation
factors
• Shared science policy-
competence
• Social vulnerability: e.g.
age, gender Aggregated
individual income, high
poverty rates
• Flood risk Flood damage • Anticipated climate
impacts
Joint
mitigation and
adaptation
factors
• Higher level, e.g. national
support, guidance or decree
Political leadership and
political will Scientific
knowledge and information
exchange
• Individual incomes Costs/
financial capacity of
municipalities Use of modern
information technology and
quality of knowledge
communication
• Coastal proximity Exposure to
weather extremes
• Experienced impacts
Factors
tested in
this study
• Adoption of national
climate change strategies
Member of Climate Alliance
Member of C40 member
Member of Covenant of
Mayors Covenant of
Mayors: Plan submitted
Member of ICLEI
• Population age Population
size Population density Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) per
capita Unemployment rate
Smart city index
• Proximity to coast Low
elevation coastal zone Altitude
above sea leve lHours of
sunshine Average temperature
of warmest month Average
temperature of coldest month
Number of rainy days Total
amount of rainfall Proportion of
green space Availability of
green space
• Aggregated Impact
Aggregated
Vulnerability Combined
Adaptive Capacity
Combined Mitigative
Capacity
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0135597.t001
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The ESPON Climate project defines climate change impact as a weighted combination of
potential physical, environmental, social, economic and cultural impacts of climate change in
the period between 2071–2100 (as compared to 1961–1990, IPCC SRES A1B scenarios).
Weights are based on results of a Delphi survey by the ESPONMonitoring Committee. The
impact is calculated from regional data as a combination of different forms of exposure to cli-
matic changes (such as change in mean temperature, mean precipitation, number of summer
days, heavy precipitation, and snow days, etc., plus river and coastal flooding resulting from a
one meter sea level rise) and recent data on physical, social, economic, environmental and cul-
tural sensitivity (such as sensitivity of transport infrastructure and tourism to climate, of popu-
lations to floods, of forests to fire, of soils to erosion, and of Natura 2000 and World heritage
sites to climate). Adaptive capacity is calculated as a weighted combination of economic capac-
ity, infrastructure capacity, technological capacity, knowledge and awareness, and institutional
capacity [68,71]. Vulnerability is calculated as a combination of potential regional impacts of
climate change and regional capacity to adapt to climate change. Mitigative capacity is calcu-
lated as a function of awareness, ability and action, measured using indicators of integration of
climate change into educational programs, attitudes to climate change, availability of technol-
ogy and non-carbon energy sources, government effectiveness, income per capita, age depen-
dency, and unemployment, among others.
The statistical analysis involves correlation and regression analyses ([53,72,73], see for simi-
lar analyses in other contexts). Non-parametric correlation tests are carried out with Kendall's
τ. Factors correlating highly significantly (p<0.01) with either a mitigation or an adaptation
plan, but not too strongly among each other, are included in binary logistic regressions (forced
entry method). Diagnostic statistics (Cook's distance, the leverage statistic, standardized resid-
uals and DFBeta values) are used to test undue influences on the model and to detect outliers.
Tests for the linearity between continuous predictors and the logit of the dependent variable as
well as multicollinearity are included.
Results and Discussion
Fig 1 shows the distribution of climate change adaptation and mitigation plans across Euro-
pean cities, as well as of the corresponding national strategies. The existence of urban climate
change plans can be visually compared with the existence and strength of national strategies
and directives, shown by the grey colour shading of countries. The United Kingdom—where
local climate change plans are compulsory—is an example of a country where urban climate
change plans are almost universal. The abundance of climate plans in Britain is due to special
circumstances: there is a legal obligation, i.e. the Climate Change Act 2008, on every municipal-
ity to have a climate change plan in place. As part of this national legislation British cities are
required to plan for projected climate change impacts, and to take action to enhance the cities’
adaptation and mitigation potential. Similar legislation in other European countries exists only
in France, which has recently adopted a similar scheme as part of Le Grenelle de l’Environne-
ment, making Territorial Climate and Energy Plans (Plans Climat-Energie Territoriaux or
TCEPs) legally mandatory. However, as the example of France shows (see Fig 1), even when
legislation requires the development of urban climate change plans these can take a while to
appear. By the end of 2012, by which time all major French cities were required to have both a
mitigation and an adaptation plan, 14 French cities out of the 35 in our sample still lacked any
plan. Most other European countries published national climate change strategies without
binding plans for cities. In the countries with national adaptation and mitigation strategies but
no specific directive for cities, such as Germany and Spain, quite a large number of cities have
climate change mitigation plans, fewer have both an adaptation and mitigation plan, and none
Drivers and Barriers of Climate Change Plans across European Cities
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has an adaptation plan only. Fig 1 shows that having a national, but for cities non-binding cli-
mate change strategy does not guarantee the development of urban climate change plans,
although national plans presumably facilitate urban plans by acting as guidance documents.
However, our sample shows that this guidance potential is not always taken advantage of.
The existence of plans differs markedly across countries. For example, almost all British cit-
ies have a climate plan in place (93% have a mitigation plan, 80% an adaptation plan), while
Spanish (50% and 19%) and Italian cities (56% and 3%) are generally less active (S1 Table).
Across the sample, 35% of the cities have no dedicated mitigation plan, 72% have no adaptation
Fig 1. Distribution of climate change adaptation andmitigation plans across European cities, their respective national strategies. Fig 1 shows the
location and distribution of cities and countries contained in the analysis. Cities are equally distributed within each country [69]. The sample covers a wide
range of countries and climate regions across Europe. Pictograms indicate the location of cities surveyed and the existence of an urban mitigation plan or a
mitigation and adaptation plan, if any (there was no city with an adaptation plan, only). Key: CC–climate change; nat.–national.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0135597.g001
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plan, and only 25% have both an adaptation and a mitigation plan with quantitative targets for
greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions. Overall, there are fewer adaptation plans than
mitigation plans in European cities, despite the widely acknowledged leadership role of Europe
in terms of environmental policy and governance and the availability of basic governance func-
tions and infrastructure required for urban climate change planning ([22], see p.78). Some of
the studied plans appear tokenistic and adaptation plans are generally less concrete than miti-
gation strategies (for example: calling for more scientific studies, urban greening or better
cooperation among urban stakeholders). However, general recommendations of this nature
can still form the basis for good quality plans as long as the role and scope of climate strategies
within the wider planning process are clearly defined [22,46]. The EC’s recently (March, 2014)
launched Covenant of Mayors initiative for adaptation to climate change (http://mayors-adapt.
eu/; access: 20th March 2015) is a demonstration of institutional awareness of the paucity of
adaptation guidelines available to local authorities. Following up the network’s activities and
outputs would be very useful for future research.
It is outside the scope of this analysis to determine whether the drivers of climate change
plans on the national level differ from those at the urban level. For example, projected high
impacts of climate change may act as a driver for the development of national plans, as much
as they might accelerate the development of urban climate change plans. However, for the pur-
poses of analysis, it is desirable to compare cities where the legal context is similar. For this rea-
son, the following analysis excludes the British cities.
Correlation analysis
Correlation analysis yields associations between climate change plans and potential drivers and
barriers affecting the development of plans for a large sample of European cities. We determine
general, broad-scale influences on the development of climate change plans rather than loca-
tion and context-specific factors. Within the list of tested factors 13 out of 16 factors were sig-
nificantly (p>0.05) related to mitigation (8 drivers, 5 barriers) and 13 out of 16 factors were
significantly related to adaptation (6 drivers, 7 barriers). Table 2 shows the significant factors
and most recent data point available. The full table with all factors and multiple years is avail-
able in S3 Table.
For mitigation, institutional and socio-economic factors are the most important influences,
with Covenant of Mayors (CoM) membership, population size, GDP per capita and Climate
Alliance membership being the four most influential. All these factors are drivers of mitigation
plans with high certainty, i.e. with positive correlation coefficients and p> 0.0001. These results
show that large and prosperous cities are disproportionally represented among the centers of
climate change planning [74,75]. Larger cities also engage much more often in climate net-
works, and are able to harness their services. Like CoM, membership of the C40 group and
ICLEI are also significant drivers, but with less influence and lower certainty. This suggests that
climate networks, which apart from ICLEI were mostly founded to support mitigation, are rela-
tively successful. Another driver with high certainty is current adaptive capacity, which is a
composite index based on an assessment of technological, informational, economic, institu-
tional and infrastructural factors.
A barrier to the development of urban mitigation plans is—with high certainty—the unem-
ployment rate of a city. This suggests that mitigation planning might be viewed as an impedi-
ment to fighting unemployment and therefore as being achievable only for cities with a low
unemployment rate. Mitigation planning is surely not used to raise employment, but more
likely viewed as requiring commitment of resources that are urgently needed for other uses, e.g.
for investment in jobs. Other significant barriers include locational and environmental factors,
Drivers and Barriers of Climate Change Plans across European Cities
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such as close proximity to the coast, high summer and winter temperatures, and future vulner-
ability—although the latter with somewhat lower explanatory power and significance level.
Future risk does not seem to motivate cities to mitigate GHG emissions today. The results of
our pan-European study therefore contrast with those from New Zealand, where it was found
that proximity to the coast increases belief in climate change and support for mitigation poli-
cies [60]—although the belief in climate change and the acceptance of policies are slightly dif-
ferent from enacting climate change plans or implementing actions. Our results suggest that
climate risk is not an effective driver of climate action [29,32], maybe due to what has been
called the psychological barrier, i.e. a feeling that “climate change (risk) is too uncertain, and
likely to happen in distant places and times, to people unlike oneself“([60], p.1). It is notewor-
thy that risk is not an effective driver of climate change action even in high risk areas.
Not significant—at least on the larger European level—are the following factors: the smart
city index, median age of the population, location in the low elevation coastal zone or high
above sea level, sunshine hours per day or rain days per annum, amount of rainfall, proportion
of green space and access to it, or predicted future climate change impacts and current mitiga-
tive capacity (documented in S3 Table). This means that smart cities do not combine ICT
implementation processes with climate change mitigation plans. It is also noteworthy that cities
in the low elevation coastal zone, in mountainous areas, and cities with large amounts of rain-
fall and/or lots of rainy days do not invest in mitigation more than other cities. Astonishingly,
nor do very ‘green’ cities engage more in mitigation than others. This means that urban green-
ery and access to green space does not necessarily relate to mitigation planning, that could be
considered another form of ‘environmentally friendly’ behaviour.
We would expect to see a degree of overlap between factors affecting adaptation and mitiga-
tion and, indeed, some drivers of mitigation are also drivers of adaptation planning. Among
these, CoMmembership, the population size of the city, and current adaptive capacity are the
most influential and significant (p>0.001) drivers of adaptation. C40 and ICLEI membership,
as well as average GDP per capita and population density are also associated with adaptation
planning, but with lower coefficients and significance levels.
Interestingly, climate networks that were originally founded to support mitigation action
also significantly correlate with adaptation plans (apart from the Climate Alliance). Adaptation
plans are mostly found among the cities of the C40 network and the CoM. The highest correla-
tion coefficient is found between CoMmembership and adaptation planning, highlighting the
importance of this network in Europe. Climate networks have been criticized for their limited
success in fostering climate action on the ground [76]. This criticism is not supported by the
evidence of this sample, with the Covenant of Mayors being particularly successful in helping
cities to prepare climate plans. It can be assumed that climate networks are important in raising
awareness and increasing knowledge of climate change [77]. However, the fact that a climate
plan exists does not provide evidence of its implementation or the success of climate actions
[78,79]. Moreover, it is debateable whether climate networks are a driver or a consequence of
climate planning. Membership of a climate network could be considered a form of climate
action, taken by cities that are already environmentally active—although this might depend on
the definition of climate action. Posey [53] showed that anticipated impacts can induce mem-
bership in climate networks (e.g. the CCP in the US) for cities at high risk from climate change
—measured as coastal proximity, and expected temperature change and casualties of extreme
weather events—suggesting that becoming a member of a climate network can be regarded a
first step towards adaptation. Our analysis shows that joining a climate network may or may
not be followed by additional action, i.e. the adoption of climate plans, but some climate net-
works appear to be very successful in helping cities to do so. Our analyses also show that it is
mostly large and prosperous cities that engage in climate networks. This is likely explained by
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the institutional, economic or staff resources required in order to join the network [22], or by
lobbying practices that make membership more difficult for smaller cities [43]. It is also note-
worthy that some cities are members of multiple networks, which is presumably indicative of a
general interest in climate issues and propensity to environmental behaviour [78].
Other socio-economic factors, such as population density and GDP per capita are also sig-
nificant for adaptation planning. Our findings support previous studies that found that per-
sonal affluence is an influential driver of urban climate planning in the US [53]. However, the
unemployment rate is not significant for adaptation in our sample, contrary to the case study
there [53]. As mentioned before, this might be a consequence of the different planning contexts
in Europe and the US.
Our study reveals a relatively large number of barriers to adaptation planning, compared
with mitigation. A notable result is the significant negative correlation with the smart city rank-
ing; although the number of cities for which this relationship can be assessed is small (N = 33),
thereby increasing uncertainty. Smart cities in our sample, which invest in ICT to harness and
develop their social and environmental capital, seldom have adaptation plans. It appears that
these cities have either committed all their resources to the smart city concept and/or may see a
conflict between being smart and being adaptive.
Being in the low elevation coastal zone and very close to the sea decreases the chance of hav-
ing an adaptation plan. Being at risk of flooding from sea level rise is therefore not a driver of
climate change plans—a noteworthy result. Being located by the sea might itself be a barrier to
action in a wider sense, because adaptation to this and other locational factors demands consid-
erable infrastructure and financial resources; or location could be a proxy variable for other
barriers that affect coastal cities.
The same holds for cities with relatively warm summer temperatures. These cities, despite
being at risk from higher temperatures and heat waves in the future, have fewer adaptation
plans. This relates particularly to cities in Southern Europe as shown in Fig 1. Their lack of
engagement with adaptation planning might be due to an underestimation of the risk or indic-
ative of lower governance and coping capacity. This in turn could be connected to the fact that
environmental taxes are lower in Southern European countries as compared with Northern
ones [80], or simply be a consequence of lower GDP. Further explanations could include a lack
of higher level government support or insufficient direction from the higher to the lower gov-
ernment levels [50,81], as well as lower perceived risk arising from extreme temperature com-
pared with other environmental hazards [82–84].
The composite vulnerability factors underline these findings. Cities at risk of severe climate
change impacts and with a high degree of future vulnerability (the latter indicator incorporates
current adaptive capacity) currently have fewer adaptation plans. Moreover, Table 2 shows
that the current adaptive capacity of a city is more strongly associated with the existence of
adaptation plans than future impact and future vulnerability. We can therefore conclude that
the current capacity of a city to engage in climate actions is a more important driver of adapta-
tion planning than anticipated impacts and anticipated vulnerability. Indeed Hinkel [63] found
that focusing on vulnerability indicators is not necessarily the right way to increase adaptive
capacity or raise awareness of climate change.
Cities at risk from climate change, such as those in low-lying coastal areas and in hot cli-
mates, are not more likely to engage in climate planning; on the contrary, they engage less. Our
analysis reveals that cities in high risk areas possess significantly less adaptive capacity—the
most important factor for climate change adaptation planning. Adaptive capacity is most
strongly associated with GDP per capita, which in turn is significantly lower in cities in high-
risk areas. This comes with the caveat that barriers and drivers are interconnected; as
highlighted by Engle [30], measures of vulnerability need to consider adaptive capacity.
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A number of drivers and barriers identified in the literature as affecting adaptation plans are
not significantly influential on the wider European level. These include: membership of the Cli-
mate Alliance—which is a network primarily focusing on mitigation; population density; the
unemployment rate; median age of the population; height of the city above sea level; climatic
attributes such as hours of sunshine per day, winter temperature, rain days per annum and
amount of rainfall; proportion of green space and access to it; and mitigative capacity (see S3
Table). As already noted for mitigation, it is interesting that ‘green’ cities do not engage in cli-
mate change action more than ‘non-green’ cities. Climate change action seems therefore not
necessarily motivated by a propensity for green or environmental behaviour. It is also notable
that cities with a high proportion of elderly citizens—considered to be a particularly vulnerable
strata of the population—are not especially motivated to engage in adaptation (or mitigation)
planning. Here again the conclusion is that climate risk does not necessarily incentivize to pro-
active planning.
Regression analyses with significant factors
Binary logistic regression tests whether a combination of chosen descriptors can predict
whether a city has a mitigation or an adaptation plan. Here, we test a model with 6 predictors,
including factors from each dimension (socio-economic, natural characteristics, and composite
climate indices), that are significantly associated with climate plans and show relatively low col-
linearity. We exclude membership of climate networks, as joining a climate network can in
itself be regarded as a climate action or response.
Using all factors that correlate highly with mitigation plans (p<0.001) yields a model of
good fit (Hosmer and Lemeshow test is not significant (p = .883)) and significantly predicts
whether a city has a mitigation plan (χ2 = 54.14, df = 5, N = 101, p< .0001). The prediction is
correct in 82% of the cases (82.9% correct where no mitigation plan exists; 81.7% correct where
a mitigation plan is in place). Assessing the ROC curve yields an area under the curve of 0.89.
For mitigation, the population size, unemployment rate and adaptive capacity of a city are
important factors with a significant contribution to the model. The odds of having a mitigation
plan increase by 6% for every ten thousand inhabitants and by almost 19% for every unit of
adaptive capacity (here calculated as an index between 0 and 100). The odds decrease by 26%
(.743) for every percentage increase in the unemployment rate (Table 3). Although the unem-
ployment rate is negatively correlated with mitigation planning, the direction of cause and
effect is unclear, i.e. whether mitigation planning reduces unemployment, or unemployment
hinders mitigation planning. The latter might be a consequence of the fact that mitigation plan-
ning would require the commitment of resources that are needed for other urban policies, e.g.
job creation schemes. In light of the importance of (adaptive) capacity for mitigation planning
it seems more plausible that a high unemployment rate reduces the availability of resources for
Table 3. Binary regression results for mitigation plans.
ß (B) SE Odds Ratio (Exp (B)) p of Wald statistic
Population size .006 .002 1.006 .003
Population density .000 .000 1.000 .230
GDP/ capita .000 .000 1.000 .102
Unemployment rate -.298 .093 .743 .001
Current Adaptive Capacity .169 .048 1.185 .000
Constant -7.669 2.531 .000 .002
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0135597.t003
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climate action and hinders mitigation planning (rather than that mitigation planning creates
employment).
For adaptation plans (Table 4), the population size of a city and its adaptive capacity are sig-
nificant predictors. The model is a relatively good fit (Hosmer and Lemeshow test, p = .43) and
can significantly predict whether a city has an adaptation plan (χ2 = 23.71, df = 5, N = 153, p<
.001). However, although overall 83% of all cases are predicted correctly, the absence of an
adaption plan is correctly predicted with far greater frequency (97.6% correct) than the exis-
tence of one (only 17.9% correct). Assessing the ROC curve yields an area under the curve of
0.72.
The likelihood that a city has an adaptation plan increases by 1% with every ten thousand
inhabitants and by 12% with every unit of adaptive capacity.
Despite the detection of highly significant factors for adaptation and mitigation planning in
our sample, it is important to note that a number of the relations have rather low correlation
coefficients. This means that either all tested factors have similarly low explanatory power or
the explanatory power of factors is highly divergent across the sample and becomes rather
small when averaged. However, testing potentially relevant alternative drivers and barriers
suggested in the literature is difficult because of a lack of comparable data across political con-
texts, countries, and cities. Potential alternative drivers include political leadership [5,8,23],
supportive political elites and political champions within cities, the presence of large powerful
industries, engagement of partners from civil society, and the occurrence of a window of
opportunity to connect climate action to large-scale, international (e.g. sporting) events [22].
Where similar data are available, definitions, and procedures for measurement and quantifica-
tion are often incompatible across cities and countries [22]. Finally, in identifying significant
barriers and drivers, this study has not considered the potential for interdependency between
them.
Our results are informative for large-scale international comparison of the influence of fac-
tors identified as significant in the available literature. An advantage of the study is the inclu-
sion of medium-sized cities [51]. However, correlation and regression analysis cannot
determine causal relations. We therefore encourage the research community to conduct
detailed analyses probing the associations identified in this study and to investigate the role of
influences that are harder to quantify, for example by using mixed-method approaches [84,85]
or qualitative analyses or interviews with decision makers [27], in order to develop broadly
applicable indices incorporating the characteristics of cities most frequently aligned with cli-
mate change response. Having a climate change plan indicates awareness of the cross-sectoral
challenges that climate change poses to the urban environment and signals a city’s general
intent to engage in strategic climate actions. However, having a mitigation or adaptation plan
is only one indicator and may not capture all activities within urban areas that are relevant to
adaptation and mitigation [86], but signals a city’s general intent to engage in strategic climate
Table 4. Binary regression results for adaptation plans.
ß (B) SE Odds Ratio (Exp (B)) p of Wald statistic
Population size .001 .000 1.001 .033
Coastal proximity -2.048 1.162 .129 .078
Future CC impact -.051 .032 .950 .111
Adaptive capacity .110 .048 1.116 .022
Future CC vulnerability .089 .054 1.093 .096
Constant -9.652 3.668 .000 .009
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0135597.t004
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actions. Our analysis shows that it is particularly difficult to predict adaptation plans. This sug-
gests that adaptation plans are indeed more context specific than mitigation plans, as already
noted in the literature [87], and/or more often developed on the regional level [4]. Future stud-
ies should also investigate the implementation process [46], and document the success of cli-
mate change plans [76]. Comparable research would also benefit from an improved
categorization or typology of barriers and drivers of climate change plans and actions.
Conclusion
Based on a selection of institutional, socio-economic and environmental factors, our study
identifies drivers and barriers affecting urban climate change plans across 200 European cities
through comparative and statistical analysis. Correlation and regression analyses reveal that
institutional, socio-economic and environmental factors are all important as barriers and driv-
ers of climate plans. Notable results include that climate networks are very effective support
mechanisms for both mitigation and adaptation planning, that predominantly large and eco-
nomically prosperous cities engage in mitigation and adaptation planning, and that particularly
vulnerable cities—in terms of future climate risk and anticipated impacts—have significantly
fewer mitigation and adaptation plans today. The current capacity of a city to engage with cli-
mate planning is thus more important than future anticipated impacts or vulnerability. This
result highlights that climate planning, particularly for adaptation, is mostly reactive. Although
policymakers have little power to alter environmental factors such as climatic variables or loca-
tion, an understanding of how these factors are (or are not) related to engagement in climate
planning is useful and necessary, for example, for the development of dedicated awareness
campaigns and deciding where to target financial and institutional support. Table 5 lists the
significant drivers and barriers of climate plans.
Regression analyses reveal that the odds of having a mitigation plan increase significantly
with increases in a city’s population size and its adaptive capacity, while the odds decrease with
a rise in the unemployment rate. The odds of having an adaptation plan also increase signifi-
cantly in line with a city’s population size and its adaptive capacity. In light of the significance
and importance of adaptive capacity for both adaptation and mitigation it seems likely that a
high unemployment rate places demands on resources that are needed for other urban policies,
e.g. job creation schemes, and thereby restricts the availability of funds for mitigation planning
(rather than that mitigation planning induces employment). Overall, it is more difficult to pre-
dict which city has an adaptation plan than which city has a mitigation plan.
With respect to policy implications, we conclude that in particular smaller and economically
weaker European cities, as well as those at high risk from future climate change, need support
to engage in mitigation and adaptation. A dedicated climate network for highly vulnerable and
Table 5. Significant (p<0.05) drivers and barriers of climate changemitigation and adaptation plans
across European cities. Drivers and barriers are listed in decreasing order of influence, i.e. from highest to
lowest correlation coefficient.
Significant drivers Significant barriers
Mitigation
plan
Covenant of Mayors member Population size
GDP/ capita Climate AllianceCurrent
Adaptive Capacity ICLEI member
Population density C40 member
Unemployment rate Proximity to coast, i.e.
<10km Average summer temperature
Average winter temperature Future CC
vulnerability
Adaptation
plan
Covenant of Mayors member Current
Adaptive Capacity Population sizeC40
member ICLEI member GDP/ capita
Population density
Smart Cities rank Proximity to coast, i.e.
<10kmFuture CC vulnerability Future CC
impact Low elevation coastal zone
Summer temperature
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0135597.t005
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potentially highly impacted cities, e.g. those at close proximity to the seas, might be very useful.
We call for more specific, immediate and comprehensive economic and institutional support
for smaller cities, cities with fewer resources and those potentially at risk of severe climate
change impacts in the future. This group of cities would also be principal beneficiaries of
higher-level programs and plans, whereby national policy acts as an institutional umbrella,
guiding and supporting action by cities.
Supporting Information
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